



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

204; *Vose v. Eagle Life and Health Ins. Co.*, 6 Cush (Mass.) 42. Where there is a warranty, as in the principal case, that the answers in the application are full and complete, as well as true, a failure to disclose all known facts is a concealment. *Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Young*, 77 Ill. App. 440.

JUDGMENT—COLLATERAL ATTACK BASED ON WANT OF SERVICE—CONTRADICTING RECORD.—Action by the plaintiff to remove the clouds cast on his title to land by two judgments rendered against his vendor. As a ground of relief the plaintiff alleged that the latter was not served with notice of suit. The records of the judgments contained recitals of service. *Held*, this was a collateral attack and that the recitals of service in the records were conclusive collaterally. *Estey & Camp et al. v. Williams* (1911), — Tex. Civ. App. —, 133 S. W. 470.

Few questions in the law of judgments are more vital or interesting than that involved in the principal case. To estop an individual from showing (except in a direct proceeding), that he has not had his day in court strikes the mind at first blush as being slightly out of harmony with our preconceived ideas of right and liberty. But that such is the law is settled by an overwhelming weight of judicial authority. VANFLEET, COLLATERAL ATTACK, § 468. The recitals of service or other jurisdictional facts in the records of courts of inferior or limited jurisdiction are generally held unimpeachable. *Seefeld v. Duffer*, 179 Fed. 214; *Hume v. Conduitt*, 76 Ind. 598; while the contrary has been held the law by the courts of a few states. *Salladay v. Bainhill*, 29 Iowa 555; *Jones v. Terry*, 43 Ark. 230. The recital of jurisdictional facts, including service, in the record of a domestic court is almost universally held to be conclusive, collaterally. *Rumfelt v. O'Brien*, 57 Mo. 569; *Western Lumber & Mill Co. v. Merchants Amusements Co.*, — Cal. —, 108 Pac. 659. Despite this formidable array of authority the contrary doctrine has been accepted as the law by courts of the highest respectability. *Goudy v. Hall*, 30 Ill. 109. According to the latter view the records are accepted as prima facie true. *Ferguson v. Crawford*, 70 N. Y. 253; *Holly v. Munro*, 55 Wash. 311, 104 Pac. 508. Many arguments are advanced concerning the relative merits of the two conflicting doctrines. Affirmatively, it is asserted that a denial of the existence of such a conclusive presumption in favor of a record's verity would bring disrepute on our judiciary because of the consequent uncertainty of interests and titles based on judicial proceedings. Also, that there is rarely any merit in a collateral attack, and therefore the court should discountenance them in all cases. But against this it is said that a man should not have his rights determined without an opportunity of being heard. Nor that he should be bound because of an inviolable presumption that a court is powerless to assert a fiction. But the conclusion in the principal case is in full accord with the generally prevailing view.

JURY—RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY—DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT—CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUALIFICATIONS.—Defendant was convicted of a serious crime. On appeal to the supreme court from the judgment, he claimed that the require-